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The communications surveillance powers granted to Canada's national security agencies have rarely resulted
in prosecution and, as a result, have been subject to very little judicial, academic, or public scrutiny. However,
as the state increasingly seeks to prosecute alleged terrorists, courts will have to interpret the scope of these
powers and decide whether they violate section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the
Charter). A review of the powers granted to police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) reveals two constitutional infirmities: allowing
police to conduct communications surveillance in terrorism investigations without establishing "investigative
necessity," and allowing CSEC to intercept domestic communications without prior judicial authorization.
Put simply, these powers should be found to violate section 8 of the Charter because they substantially
infringe on the privacy of innocent Canadians, especially of Muslim or Arab background, while doing little to
advance national security.
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National Security Surveillance in an Age
of Terror: Statutory Powers & Charter
Limits
STEVEN PENNEY*
The communications surveillance powers granted to Canada's national security agencies
have rarely resulted in prosecution and, as a result, have been subject to very little judicial,
academic, or public scrutiny. However, as the state increasingly seeks to prosecute alleged
terrorists, courts will have to interpret the scope of these powers and decide whether they
violate section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charted: A review of
the powers granted to police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) reveals two constitutional infirmities: allowing police to conduct communications surveillance in terrorism investigations
without establishing "investigative necessity," and allowing CSEC to intercept domestic
communications without prior judicial authorization. Put simply, these powers should be
found to violate section 8 of the Charter because they substantially infringe on the privacy
of innocent Canadians, especially of Muslim or Arab background, while doing little to advance national security.
Alors que les pouvoirs de surveillance des communications'accord6s aux organismes de
s6curit6 nationaLe du Canada ont rarement entrain6 des poursuites, its ont fait l'objet de
fort peu d'examens judiciaires, universitaires ou publics. Toutefois, A mesure que tEtat
cherche de plus en plus a poursuivre de pretendus terroristes, Les tribunaux devront interpr6ter Ia port~e de ces pouvoirs et d6cider si l'un d'entre eux enfreint ['article 8 de Ia Charte
canadienne des droits et libertes (Ia Charte). Un examen des pouvoirs accordes aux services de police, au Service canadien du renseignement de securit6 (SCRS) et au Centre de [a
s6curit6 des t6lecommunications Canada (CSTCj r6veLe deux deficiences constitutionnelLes, notamment de permettre a Ia police de proceder a Lasurveillance des communications
Lors d'enquites sur le terrorisme sans 6tablir ta <<n6cessit6 de tenir une enquite ), et de
permettre au CSTC d'intercepter des communications nationales sans autorisation judiciaire
pr6alable. Plus simplement, on devrait trouver que ces pouvoirs contreviennent 6 l'article 8
de [a Charte, 6tant donn6 quits portent considerablement atteinte Ala protection des renseignements personnels de Canadiens innocents (plus particuLi~rement de ceux d'ascendance
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musulmane ou arabel, tout en accomplissant fort peu pour ce qui est de faire progresser
s~curite nationale.
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IN RESPONSE TO recent terrorist attacks, many nations have passed laws broadening the surveillance capacities of law enforcement and national security agencies.' Some have argued that these laws unduly diminish the liberty, privacy, and
equality interests of non-terrorists, especially those who innocently share racial,
ethnic, religious, or ideological affiliations with terrorist groups.' Some of these
laws have also been challenged for violating constitutional rights.'
To date, Canada has experienced little of this controversy. Like many other
countries, Canada introduced a raft of legislative changes in the aftermath of 11
September 2001 (9/11), including enhancements to terrorism-related surveillance
powers.' But challenges to counter-terrorism laws have thus far centred on other
issues, such as immigration procedures' and the definition of terrorist offences.'

I.

See e.g. The Unitingand StrengtheningAmerica by ProvidingAppropriate Tools Required to
Interceptand Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (United
States); Regulation ofInvestigatory PowersAct 2000 (U.K.), 2000, c. 23 (United Kingdom);
and Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (Cth.) (Australia).

2.

See e.g. Jack M. Balkin, "The Constitution in the National Surveillance State" (2009) 93
Minn. L. Rev. 1; Kent Roach, "The Role and Capacities of Courts and Legislatures in Reviewing Canada's Anti-Terrorism Law" (2008) 24 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 5.

3.

See e.g. Mayfieldv. US., 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cit. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 79 USLW
3018 (22 June 2010).

4.

SeeAnti-terrorismAct, S.C. 2001, c. 41 [Anti-terrorism Act].

5.

See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 [Charkaoui].
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The reason for this is simple: before 9/11, Canada's national security agencies
already had broad surveillance powers. But as the use of these powers rarely resulted in prosecution, they have been subjected to very little judicial, academic,
or public scrutiny.'
This may be changing. As the state increasingly seeks to prosecute alleged
terrorists, courts will have to interpret the scope of these powers and decide
whether any of them violate section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which grants everyone "the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure."9
This simple and concise right has undergone extensive judicial elaboration.
The baseline rules, however, were set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc.'" At the broadest level of generality, section 8 requires courts to balance our interest in being free of state-sponsored privacy invasions against our interest in using such invasions to combat threats to the
public good." Somewhat more precisely, the Court in Hunter directed that the
former interest should generally prevail over the latter, unless an arbiter independent of the state's law enforcement apparatus (such as a judge) authorizes

6.

See R. v. Khawaja (2006), 214 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused, (2007) 233 O.A.C. 395 [Khawaja 2006].

7.

Most national security prosecutions have been for contraventions of the Official Secrets Act,
now the Security ofInformation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-5. Befitting the Cold War era, this
legislation was directed at offences of subversion or diplomatic impropriety. See Canada,
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Policy Review, The RCMP and NationalSecurity: A Background Paperto the Commission's
ConsultationPaper(Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials
in Relation to Maher Arar, 2004) at 8-9, 33-34 [Arar Inquiry, RCMP and NationalSecurity].

8.

See e.g. Isabel Teoronio, "Was teen a terrorist or just troubled?" Toronto Star (3 July 2008)
A18 (wiretap evidence presented in terrorism trial); Kent Roach, "The Toronto Terrorism
Arrests" (2006) 51 Crim. L.Q. 389; and Anthony Depalma, "Terror Arrests Reveal Reach of
Canada's Surveillance Powers" The New York Times (8 June 2006) Al 2, online: <http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/americas/08canada.html>.

9.

Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [Charter].

10.

[19841 2 S.C.R. 145 [Hunter].

11.

Ibid. at 159-60. See also Steven Penney, "Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel
Search Technologies: An Economic Approach" (2007) 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 477 at
479 [Penney, "Reasonable Expectations"].
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the invasion ex ante on the basis that there are "reasonable and probable grounds
... to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to
be found at the place of the search."1 2 In other words, privacy invasions meeting
both of these conditions, which I refer to as "prior authorization" and "reasonable
grounds," are prima facie reasonable under section 8; invasions that do not are
prima facie unreasonable.13
The Court has recognized many exceptions to these requirements. Occasionally, privacy interests may be so strong that prior authorization and reasonable
grounds are not enough on their own to make an intrusion reasonable."4 Most
relevant here, the Court has stated (in obiter) that state agents may also have to
show that there is "no other reasonable alternative method of investigation"
before obtaining an authorization to intercept electronic communications. This
is known as the "investigative necessity" requirement.
More frequently, intrusions have been found to be reasonable without compliance with the requirements laid out in Hunter, especially outside the domain
of criminal law enforcement.' State agents may thus sometimes conduct searches
12.

Hunter,supra note 10 at 168. This assumes that the person alleging a s. 8 violation had a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the circumstances. Absent such an expectation, there is
no "search or seizure" and hence no violation of s. 8. See Hunter at 159; R. v. Dyment,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 at 426 (state surveillance of electronic communications content
(whether voice or text) clearly invades a reasonable expectation of privacy). See R. v. Duarte,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 at para. 18 [Duarte];R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62; R. v. Thompson,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111 at para. 35 [Thompson]; R. v. Weir, [1998] 8 W.W.R. 228 at paras.
70-77 (Alta. Q.B.), af'd (2001), 156 C.C.C. (3d) 188 (Alta. C.A.); and Robert W. Hubbard, Peter DeFreitas & Susan Magotiaux, "The Internet - Expectations of Privacy in a New
Context" (2002) 45 Crim. L.Q. 170 at 196-97.

13.

Hunter, ibid.

14.

See Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v.
Canada (Attorney General);R. v. Fink, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209 [Lavallee] (special conditions always required for searches of lawyers' offices); CanadianBroadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 [CanadianBroadcastingCorp.] (special
conditions sometimes required for searches of journalistic materials); and Thompson, supra
note 12 (special conditions required for wiretapping public payphone to minimize invasion
of non-suspects' privacy).

15.

R. v. Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992 at paras. 24, 29 [Araujo 2000]. See also Duarte, supra note
12 at para. 24.

16. See generally Araujo 2000, ibid.
17.

See e.g. Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Directorof Investigationand Research, Restrictive
Trade PracticesCommission), [ 19 90] 1 S.C.R. 425; R. v. McKinlay TransportLtd., [ 1990] 1
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without prior authorization as well as searches based on standards lower than
reasonable grounds." Most relevant here, the Court has hinted, without elaborating, that the reasonable grounds requirement might have to be modified in
the context of national security."
For national security surveillance, the Court's section 8 jurisprudence thus
pulls in opposing directions. On the one hand, it suggests that, since communications surveillance is such a grave and pernicious threat to privacy, it should not
be used unless truly necessary. On the other, the jurisprudence reflects the concern
that since terrorism is such a grave and diffuse threat to security, we should not
condition national security surveillance on reasonable grounds.
Fortunately, it is not as difficult to reconcile these principles as it may appear. As parliament, courts, and legal theorists have long recognized, communications surveillance is exceptionally intrusive and ought not to be conducted in
the absence of investigative necessity, whether in the context of national security or that of conventional policing. Investigative necessity is not especially onerous, and it serves as a real check on abusive surveillance. Without it,
communications surveillance should not be considered "reasonable" under section 8 of the Charter.
At the same time, the Court has been right to imply that strict adherence
to the reasonable grounds requirement from Hunter may not always be feasible
in national security matters. National security surveillance efforts are typically

S.C.R. 627 (taxation); R v. Fitzpatrick, [199514 S.C.R. 154 at paras. 49-51 (fisheries); British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, [ 1995] 2 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 51-64 (securities);
Comitiparitairede lindustriede La chemise v. Potash; Comitiparitairede l'industrie de la
chemise v. Selection Milton, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406 (employment standards); Weatheraiv. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 (prison discipline); R. v. M. (MR.), [1998] 3
S.C.R. 393 (school discipline); R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 [Simmons] (border security); R. v. Monney, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652 [Monney] (same); and R. v.]acques, [1996] 3 S.C.R.
312 [Jacques] (same).
18.

Deviations from Hunterhave also been recognized in the criminal context, typically where
courts have found that suspects' reasonable expectations of privacy are diminished by arrest,
detention, or the nature of the implicated privacy interest. See e.g. Cloutierv. Langlois,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (search incident to arrest); R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (search incident to detention); R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 [Kang-Brown]; and R. v. A.M,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (canine sniff search).
,

19.

Hunter, supra note 10 at 168 ("[wlhere the state's interest is not simply law enforcement as,
for-instance, where state security is involved ... the relevant standard might well be a different one").
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less targeted and more preventative than conventional criminal investigations.
Advances in communications technology have also complicated the application
of the reasonable grounds standard to national security surveillance. As a consequence, national security agencies should not have to demonstrate that the proposed surveillance will reveal evidence that a particular suspect has committed
an offence. That said, the exigencies of national security do not justify the elision of prior authorization. Without it, the edifice of protection against abusive
surveillance crumbles.
I elaborate these arguments with reference to the communications surveillance powers available to the three entities responsible for national security in
Canada: (1) the police, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP), (2) the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and (3) the
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC). This examination
reveals two constitutional infirmities: allowing police to conduct communications surveillance in terrorism investigations without establishing investigative
necessity and allowing CSEC to intercept domestic communications without
prior judicial authorization. Put simply, these powers should be found to violate section 8 of the Charterbecause they infringe substantially on the privacy of
innocent Canadians, especially those of Muslim or Arab background, while doing little to advance national security. Perhaps not surprisingly, both powers
were enacted hastily in response to the same notorious terrorist act: 9/11.
The departures from the Hunter decision's reasonable grounds requirement, which are found in the communications surveillance provisions applying
to CSIS and CSEC, in contrast, should not be found to violate section 8. These
provisions condition surveillance on the basis that it will provide either evidence of threats to national security (in the case of CSIS) or foreign intelligence
essential to international affairs, defence, or security (in the case of CSEC).
Given these agencies' proactive, intelligence-gathering mandates, the nature and
magnitude of terrorist threats, and other privacy protections included in the
relevant legislation, these requirements achieve a sensible balance between privacy and security.
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1. POLICE
A. CONTEXT AND LEGISLATION
As the categories of national security offences and criminal offences overlap,
police have long investigated national security threats. 20 The exercise of police
powers, however, does not typically turn on any distinction between national
security and criminal matters. One exception is the electronic communications surveillance power set out in part VI of the Criminal Code (the Code).21
Though this power may be used in relation to a wide variety of offences, post9/11 amendments have made it easier to use it in terrorism cases than in ordinary criminal cases.22
Communications surveillance in national security investigations is typically
conducted by the RCMP. However, RCMP agents work closely with other
law enforcement and national security agencies, and information is shared freely
among them. 23 The focus here, then, is on the powers themselves, and not on
the officials who exercise them.
Subject to several exceptions, part VI of the Code prohibits and provides
criminal punishments for the electronic interception of private, domestic com-

20.

For histories of police involvement in national security, see Arar Inquiry, RCMP andNationalSecurity, supra note 7 at 5-35; Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain
Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Freedom and Security under the Law: Second Report, vol. I (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1981) at 149-58 (Chair, D.C.
McDonald) [McDonald Commission]; Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards
Unity: CriminalJustice and Corrections(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 83-86 (Chair:
Roger Ouimet); and Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials
in Relation to Maher Arar, A New Review Mechanismfor the RCMP's NationalSecurity Activities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) [Arar Inquiry, New
Review Mechanism].

21.

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. [CriminalCode].

22.

See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.

23.

See Arar Inquiry, RCMPand NationalSecurity, supra note 7 at 7-8, 16-18, 30-32, 56-76. For
examinations of provincial, federal, and international law governing national security information sharing, see Stanley A. Cohen, Privacy, Crime and Terror: Legal Rights and Security in
a Time ofPeril(Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at 117-25, 391 [Cohen, Privacy,
Crime and Terror]; Craig Forcese, National Security Law: CanadianPractice in International
Perspective (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 439-43, 491-95. See also PrivacyAct, R.S.C.
1985, c. P-21, ss. 8(2), 18; PrivacyRegulations, S.O.R./83-508.
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munications. 2' To be covered by this prohibition, a communication must be
both "intercepted"2 and attract a "reasonable expectation of privacy."26 There
are unresolved interpretive questions relating to each of these requirements,27
but the basic scope of the prohibition is well understood. Absent an exception,
it is a crime for any person, including a state agent, to use technological means
to prospectively capture the content of both oral and electronic text communications. This includes the real-time interception of wire-line and wireless telephone conversations, as well as e-mail and other electronic text.
Part VI also applies to (but does not criminalize) the observation "by means
of a television camera or other similar electronic device ... [of] ... any person

who is engaged in activity in circumstances in which the person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy."" It does not likely apply, in contrast, to the retrospective acquisition of stored communications, which may thus be obtained using
ordinary search warrants.o
As mentioned, these prohibitions are subject to several exceptions, the
most important of which permits police to obtain an interception authoriza-

24.

CriminalCode, supra note 21, s. 184(1). Section 193 also makes it an offence to use or disclose intercepted private communications for any purpose not related to law enforcement or
the operation of communications networks.

25. See ibid., s. 184(1). This section states that anyone "who, by means of any electro-magnetic,
acoustic, mechanical or other device, wilfully intercepts a private communication is guilty of
an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years."
26. See ibid., s. 183. This section defines "private communication" as
any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator who is in
Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is in Canada and that
is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will
not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive
it, and includes any radio-based telephone communication that is treated electronically or
otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the
person intended by the originator to receive it.
27.

See Steven Penney, "Updating Canada's Communications Surveillance Laws: Privacy and
Security in the Digital Age" (2008) 12 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 115 [Penney, "Updating Canada's Communications Surveillance Laws").

28.

See ibid at 118-26.

29.

Criminal Code, supra note 21, ss. 487.01(4)-(5).

30.

Penney, "Updating Canada's Communications Surveillance Laws," supra note 27 at 126-29.
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tion from a judge." The requirements for obtaining such an authorization are
more onerous than those applying to ordinary search warrants. 3 2 For both ordinary search warrants and authorizations under part VI, police must show that
they have reasonable and probable grounds" to believe that the interception
will provide evidence of an offence. 3 ' And in both cases, evidence obtained in
violation of this or any other statutory requirement may be excluded at trial
under section 24(2) of the Charter." But unlike ordinary warrants, part VI authorizations may be obtained only from superior court judges" and only to fur-

31.

See CriminalCode, supra note 21, s. 184(2)(b). See also generally Robert W. Hubbard, Peter
M. Brauti & Scott K. Fenton, Wiretappingand Other Electronic Surveillance:Law and Procedure, looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc., 2005) at § 2.2.2.

32.

There are a number of such provisions in the CriminalCode and other statutes. The most
frequently used is s. 487 of the Code, which permits searches of a "building, receptacle, or
place." Supra note 21.

33.

"Reasonable and probable grounds" is equivalent to "reasonable grounds," "probable
grourids," "reasonable and probable cause," and "probable cause." See generally Hunter, supra note 10 at 167 ("[t]he state's interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail
over the individual's interest in being left alone at the point where credibly-based probability
replaces suspicion"); Kang-Brown, supra note 18 at paras. 10, 13, LeBel J., and 24, 75, Binile J. Courts have not consistently articulated a precise or quantifiable definition of the standard. Some courts have treated it as equivalent to "more likely than not," but others have
suggested that it signifies a lesser degree of probability. See R.E. Salhany, CanadianCriminal
Procedure,6th ed., looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2005) § 3.1140.

34.

The CriminalCode does not explicitly require police to establish reasonable and probable
grounds. Section 186(1)(a) does oblige the judge issuing the warrant to be satisfied that "it
would be in the best interests of the administration of justice to do so." Supra note 21. This
provision has been interpreted as requiring police to establish "reasonable and probable
grounds to believe that an offence has been or is being committed and that the authorization
sought will afford evidence of that offence." Duarte,supra note 12 at para. 24. See also
Araujo 2000, supra note 15; R. v. Garofli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 at 1444 [Garofoli].

35.

In most cases, failing to conform to the requirements of part VI of the Code constitutes a
violation of s. 8 of the Charter.See Thompson, supra note 12.

36.

Most ordinary warrants, including those available under s. 487 of the CriminalCode, may be
granted by provincially-appointed judges. Superior court judges are appointed by the federal
government. However, the requirement that only superior court judges may grant part VI
authorizations does not apply in Quebec, where such authorizations may be granted by the
provincially-appointed judges of the Court of Quebec. See CriminalCode, supra note 21, ss.
185(1), 552.
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ther the investigation of certain listed offences." In addition, the application
for the authorization must include the written consent of the responsible
minister or his or her designate."
The most important difference between an ordinary warrant and an authorization allowed under part VI, however, is that only the latter (generally) requires
police to demonstrate investigative necessity, i.e., "that other investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed, other investigative procedures are
unlikely to succeed, or the urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry out the investigation of the offence using only other investigative
procedures."" The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted this requirement
to mean that, "practically speaking, ... [there must be] ... no other reasonable

alternative method of investigation."'o Interception need not be an investigative
method of "last resort."" The test can be satisfied by demonstrating that
"normal investigative techniques are unlikely to succeed." 2 Nevertheless, the requirement is more rigorous than simply showing that interception would likely
be the "most efficacious"'" way to further the investigation. Such a standard, the
courts have held, would "replace a standard of necessity with one of opportunity at the discretion of law enforcement bodies.""

37.

Ibid., ss. 183, 185(1). This list, it should be noted, is very long and includes all terrorismrelated offences, including those that may not directly result in violence or harm. See infa
notes 82-101 and accompanying text.

38.

Ibid, s. 185(1).

39.

Ibid., s. 186(1)(b). The legislative history of the investigative necessity requirement is recounted in N.J. Whitling, "Wiretapping, Investigative Necessity, and the Charter" (2002) 46
Crim. L.Q. 89 at 107-08.

40.

Araujo 2000, supra note 15 at para. 29.

41.

Ibid. This had been suggested in earlier decisions. See e.g. Duarte,supra note 12 at para. 46;
R. v. Commisso, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 121 at 135, Dickson J., dissenting; Thompson, supra note 12
at para. 92, La Forest J., dissenting; and R. v. Finlay (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 at 69 (Ont.
C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1986] 1 S.C.R. ix [Finliay.

42. Araujo 2000, ibid. at para. 29.
43. Ibid. at para. 39. This had also been suggested in previous decisions, including that of the
court below in Araujo 2000. R. v. Araujo (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 315 at para. 30 (B.C.
C.A.) [Araujo 1998]. See also R. v. Paulson (1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (B.C. C.A.); R. v.
Cheung (1997), 119 C.C.C. (3d) 507 (B.C. C.A.).
44. Araujo 2000, ibid at para. 39.
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Investigative necessity can be demonstrated in numerous ways, for example, by showing that alternative methods, such as the use of physical surveillance, informants, undercover agents, and ordinary search warrants, would
likely be dangerous or ineffective." Such conditions are often present when investigating "a large-scale crime organization, a close-knit family or a drug conspiracy," where "counter-surveillance methods" are common."
In 1997, in response to a spate of gang violence,17 parliament removed the
investigative necessity requirement for investigations of "criminal organization""
offences. In 2001, in response to 9/11, it did the same for "terrorism" offences.
Two additional exemptions for criminal organization and terrorism investigations accompanied these amendments. First, the maximum period of interception, subject to renewal, was extended from the ordinary sixty dayso to one
year.5 1 Second, investigators wishing to extend the deadline for disclosing the
authorization to targets were exempted from the usual requirement to show
that their investigation was "continuing."' 2
In summary, police may conduct electronic surveillance of private, domestic
communications and activities when they have reasonable grounds to believe
that such surveillance will reveal evidence of a broad range of criminal offences,
including all terrorism-related offences. If they are investigating suspected terror45. Ibid. at paras. 41-43.
46. Ibid.
47.

See Don Stuart, "Time to Recodify Criminal Law and Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons From the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution" (2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89 at 92.

48.

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminalorganizations)and to amend other Acts in consequence, S.C. 1997, c. 23, ss. 4-5. For the definitions of "criminal organization" and "criminal
organization offence," see CriminalCode, supra note 21, ss. 2, 467.1. For criticisms of the
breadth of these definitions, see Stuart, ibid. To date, constitutional challenges to these definitions have failed. See R. v. Terezakis (2007), 223 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (B.C. C.A.) (upholding
s. 467.13), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 487; R. v. Lindsay (2009),
245 C.C.C. (3d) 301 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No.
540 (upholding ss. 467.1 and 467.12); and R. v. Smith (2006) 280 Sask. R. 128 (Q.B.) (upholding ss. 467.1, 467.12, and 467.13).

4
49. Anti-terrorismAct, supra note , ss. 6.1, 133(8.1). The criminal organization and terrorism
exemptions to the investigative necessity requirement are codified by the CriminalCode,
ibid., ss. 185(1.1), 186(1.1).

50.

CriminalCode, ibid., ss. 186(4)(e), 186(7).

51.

Ibid., s. 186.1.

52.

Ibid., s. 196(5).
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ists (or other criminal groups), they: (1) do not have to demonstrate investigative necessity ("the investigative necessity exemption"), (2) may be permitted to
conduct the surveillance for a longer period of time ("the surveillance period
extension"), and (3) will have an easier time justifying delays in informing the
targets of the surveillance ("the notice exception").
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Before the gang and terrorism amendments, the Supreme Court upheld part VI
of the Code in the context of section 8 Charter challenges." The question here
is whether any of the terrorism amendments are likely to alter this conclusion.
First consider the surveillance period extension. In theory, the maximum surveillance period is just that-a maximum. The issuing judge must still determine the
proper length of the surveillance after considering all of the circumstances." But
in practice, the maximum could become the norm, as it has in cases governed by
the ordinary time period." Nevertheless, if and when the Court deals with this
issue, it is much more likely to stress the importance of critically assessing the
justification for a longer time period than it is to strike down the provision."
The Court is also unlikely to strike down the notice exception. Like the surveillance period extension, the notice exception appears to rest on the assumption that terrorism investigations are almost always lengthy. As will be discussed
below, the Code's expansive definition of terrorism calls this assumption into
question. Even in terrorism cases, however, the judge cannot authorize a delay
unless the applicant shows that the "interests of justice" require it.s" What could
such a showing entail, other than demonstrating that notification would compromise an ongoing investigation?"'

53.

See Duarte,supra note 12 at para. 45; Garofoli, supra note 34 at para. 25.

54.

See R. v. Doiron (2004), 274 N.B.R. (2d) 120 at para. 48 (Q.B.), affd (2007), 315 N.B.R.
(2d) 205 (CA.) [Doiron]. Recall as well that authorizations for both exempted and nonexempted offences are renewable in any case. CriminalCode, supra note 21, s. 186(6).

55.

See Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 3.7.9.

56.

See Doiron, supra note 54 (upholding the criminal organization time period extension). One
court has ruled that so long as one gang or terrorism offence is named in the authorization,
the maximum time period is one year, even if other, non-exempted offences are also named.
See R. v. Lam (2004), 355 A.R. 363 at paras. 5, 43-52 (Q.B.).

57.

Criminal Code, supra note 21, s. 196.

58.

See Hubbard, Branti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 3.11.5.1.
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The constitutionality of the investigative necessity exemption is more
questionable. Though it has not ruled on the question, the Supreme Court
has indicated that the sweeping invasion of privacy entailed by electronic surveillance is not justified without investigative necessity. As Justice La Forest
stated in R. v. Duarte,
[I]f the state were free, at its sole discretion, to make permanent electronic recordings
of our private communications, there would be no meaningful residuum to our
right to live our lives free from surveillance. The very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the potential, if left unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, at
the whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic recording made
of our words every time we opened our mouths might be superbly equipped to
fight crime, but would be one in which privacy no longer had any meaning. As
Douglas J., dissenting in United States v. White, supra, put it, at p. 756: "Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known." If the
State may arbitrarily record and transmit our private communications, it is no
longer possible to strike an appropriate balance between the right of the individual to be left alone and the right of the state to intrude on privacy in the furtherance of its goals, notably the need to investigate and combat crime.5

Put more instrumentally, the legal regulation of electronic surveillance encourages people to communicate more candidly than they otherwise would." As
Richard Posner explains, the "principal effect of allowing eavesdropping would
not be to make the rest of society more informed about the individual but to
make conversations more cumbersome and less effective."" Regulation also
lessens the need to protect privacy by other means.62 Without it, people may
59.

Duarte,supra note 12 at para. 45. See also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Electronic
Surveillance (Working Paper 47) (Ottawa: The Commission, 1986) at 31 (describing wiretap
authorizations as "a huge electronic vacuum cleaner").

60.

See generally Penney, "Reasonable Expectations," supra note 11 at 492-93; Richard Posner,
"Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation" (1979) 28 Buff. L. Rev. I at 17; Charles J. Hartmann &
Stephen M. Renas, "Anglo-American Privacy Law: An Economic Analysis" (1985) 5 Int'l
Rev. L. & Econ. 133 at 145; and Anthony Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment" (1974) 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 at 388.

61.

Richard Posner, "The Right To Privacy" (1978) 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393 at 403.

62.

See David Friedman, "Privacy and Technology" (2000) 17 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 186 at 192-93;
Andrew Song, "Technology, Terrorism, and the Fishbowl Effect: An Economic Analysis of
Surveillance and Searches" (Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2003-04, Harvard
Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 73, 2003) at 15-16, online: <http://papers.
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wastefully expend resources to enhance the security of their communications,
for example, by using more costly, anonymous communications tools (such as
public payphones or prepaid cellphones) instead of less costly, non-anonymous
ones (such as registered phones).
Of course, as Justice La Forest recognized in Duarte, privacy's benefits
must be balanced with its costs to law enforcement." An appropriate balance
was achieved, in his view, by the then-existing protections of part VI, including
the reasonable grounds, prior authorization, and investigative necessity requirements." Similarly, in R. v. Araujo, the leading decision in 2000 defining
investigative necessity, Justice LeBel stated for a unanimous Court that
we must not forget that the text of s. 186(1) represents a type of constitutional
compromise. In particular, the investigative necessity requirement embodied in s.
186(1) is one of the safeguards that made it possible for this Court to uphold these
65
parts of the Criminal Code on constitutional grounds.

As the constitutionality of the investigative necessity exemption was not at issue, this passage is obiter dicta." However, it does reflect a consistent theme in
the Court's part VI and section 8 jurisprudence: communications surveillance
should not occur unless an independent arbiter is satisfied that it is truly necessary to combat serious crime.
ssrn.com/abstract=422220>; Amsterdam, supra note 60 at 403; and United States v. Dunn,
480 U.S. 294 at 319 (1987), Brennan J., dissenting.
63.

Duarte,supra note 12 at para. 24.

64.

Ibid. at paras. 24-26. See also Garofoli, supra note 34 at 1444.

65. Araujo 2000, supra note 15 at para. 26 [emphasis added]. See also R v. S.A.B., [2003] 2
S.C.R. 678 at para. 53 [S.A.B.] (referring, in the context of assessing the constitutionality of
the CriminalCode's DNA warrant provisions, to investigative necessity as a "constitutional
requirement" for wiretap authorizations).
66.

LeBel J. specifically noted that the criminal organization amendment was "not invoked or
examined in the case at bar." Araujo 2000, ibid. at para. 2.

67.

Other than electronic surveillance, the Supreme Court has considered whether investigative
necessity is constitutionally required in the following contexts. It found that it is always required for searches of potentially privileged material in lawyers' offices (see Lavallee, supra
note 14); sometimes required for searches of media offices (CanadianBroadcastingCorp., supra
note 14 at 478); CanadianBroadcastingCorporationv. Lessard, [ 1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 at 446);
and never required for the taking of bodily samples for identification purposes (SA.B., supra
note 65 at paras. 53-54).

PENNEY, NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE

261

No court has yet considered the investigative necessity exemption for terrorism offences. However, despite the Supreme Court's obiter, lower courts in
other contexts have concluded that investigative necessity is not constitutionally
required. The first decision to do so, R. v. Bordage," considered the Code's one
party consent surveillance provisions. Before 1993, this type of surveillance was
unregulated. After the Supreme Court decided that this violated section 8, parliament enacted the authorization process referred to above.69 It did not, however, include an investigative necessity requirement.
This omission is understandable. Though rightly deserving of section 8
regulation, consent surveillance poses a substantially lesser threat to privacy
than third party surveillance. In the former case, one of the parties to the communication (usually an informer or undercover police officer) is aware of the
interception. Such schemes are often dangerous and carry a high risk of exposure. Police are unlikely to use them when effective, alternative measures are
available. An investigative necessity requirement would thus do little to decrease the frequency of consent surveillance. Third party surveillance, in contrast, is both less dangerous and less likely to be exposed. In the absence of an
investigative necessity requirement, it would likely be used more frequently.
Compared to third party surveillance, consent surveillance is also less invasive. In revealing confidences to another, there is always a chance that our
confidant will use the information to our detriment, for example by conveying it to police. This risk is magnified when the conversation is overheard (and
potentially recorded) by state agents.70 It is not as great, however, as the risk
that the state will intercept and record confidences that have not been betrayed.
Third party surveillance renders trust irrelevant-the state may be listening
even if we are conversing with a faithful confidant.
Third party surveillance is also more likely than consent surveillance to
capture innocent communications." Consent intercepts capture only the con-

68.

(2000), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 549 (Qc. C.A.). See also R. v. G.L., [2004] O.J. No. 5675 at paras.
86-90 (Sup. Ct.) (QL), sub nom. R. v. Largie, [2004] O.T.C. 1193 (holding that while police
need not demonstrate investigative necessity in every case, it is a "factor to be considered" in
deciding whether to exercise the discretion to issue the authorization).

69.

See An Act to amend the CriminalCode, the Crown Liability and ProceedingsAct and the RadiocommunicationAct, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4; supra note 31.

70.

See Duarte, supra note 12 at paras. 27-32.

71.

See Thompson, supra note 12 at paras. 47-49.
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versations of a single, named person (along with, of course, the person(s) conversing with that individual).72 The authorizing judge may also permit only a
subset of these conversations to be captured, such as those with named targets,
with unnamed persons located at a particular place, or in furtherance of a bona
fide investigation." Third party authorizations may include analogous conditions, such as live monitoring and retrospective editing,75 but they are more
costly and thus less likely to be imposed.
The investigative necessity requirement, moreover, is not the only difference
between third party and consent surveillance. The less invasive nature of the
latter is also evidenced by the fact that applications may be made by the police,
instead of agents of the responsible minister. They may be made to provincial
court judges as well as superior court judges, obtained in relation to any federal
offence, and obtained by tele-warrants.

72.

See Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 3.5.5.2.

73.

Ibid.Unlike in the United States, in Canada such "minimizing" conditions are not mandatory, except in the case of video monitoring. Instead, judges may impose them when they are
"advisable in the public interest." CriminalCode, supra note 21, ss. 186(4)(), 487.01(4).
This decision is discretionary, but in certain circumstances a failure to minimize may constitute a violation of s. 8 of the Charter.See Finlay,supra note 41; Thompson, supra note 12 at
paras. 1143-46; and Garojoli,supra note 34 at 1468.

74.

Such monitoring, which may be effected by either visual or audio observation, is designed to
ensure that interception only occurs (or continues) if police confirm that a target is a party to
the communication. Audio monitoring conditions may also require the interception to cease
after a certain period if there is no indication that relevant matters are being discussed. See
Thompson, supra note 12; Hubbard, Brauti, & Fenton, supra note 31, § 4.4-4.4.1.

75. This condition permits the recording of all authorized interceptions, but requires investigators to cease listening to and seal irrelevant portions of the communication. See e.g. R. v.
Steel (1995), 34 Alta. L.R. (3d) 440 at para. 11 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,
187 A.R. 318n.
76. See Finlay, supra note 41 at 75; R. v. Taylor, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 26 at para. 18; and Stanley A.
Cohen, Invasion ofPrivacy: Policeand ElectronicSurveillance in Canada (Toronto: Carswell,
1983) at 174.
77.

CriminalCode, supra note 21, ss. 184.2-184.3. It has also been suggested that investigative
necessity was not made a prerequisite of consent surveillance because one party to the conversation is by definition a state agent and can relay the information to police, prosecutors,
and the court in viva voce form. See Hubbard, Brauti, & Fenton, supra note 31, § 2.2.5; R
v. Rosebush (1992), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 241 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 78
C.C.C. (3d) vi. On this view, it would be impossible in these circumstances to show that
there is "no other reasonable alternative method of investigation."
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The consent surveillance cases do not help us decide, therefore, whether section 8 requires investigative necessity for third party criminal organization and
terrorism authorizations. To date, the courts have addressed, and upheld, only the
criminal organization exemption." The argument in favour of the terrorism exception, however, is likely to be similar. That argument, in short, is that compared to the average, solitary wrongdoer, criminal and terrorist organizations are
more sophisticated, impenetrable, and dangerous." In this view, the investigative
necessity requirement unduly hampers the ability of police to conduct surveillance of these groups. If organized criminals and terrorists are by definition "hard
targets,""a a categorical exemption would save resources and prevent unjustified
dismissals of authorization applications.
If the exemption were truly limited to sophisticated criminal enterprises,
this argument might have some purchase. Who would contest the necessity of
electronic surveillance to combat biker gangs, transnational mafias, or Al-Qaeda?
As the authors of a leading text on electronic surveillance have written, compared
to criminal organization exemptions, "there is even greater justification for more
intrusive state conduct and extraordinary police powers when the security of
the nation is at risk.""'
On close inspection, however, we see that the exemptions are not limited
to investigations of sophisticated or (especially) dangerous groups. Others have
examined the criminal organization exemption," so the focus here is on the exemption for any "terrorism offence,"" which, by definition, includes any one
of the following:

78.

R. v. Doucet (2003), 18 C.R. (6th) 103 (Qc. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Pangman (2000), 147 Man. R.
(2d) 93 (Q.B.); and Doiron, supra note 54.

79.

See e.g. Doiron, ibid. at paras. 59-61, 64 (noting the "sophisticated methods" of "criminal
organizations").

80.

See House of Commons Debates, No. 160 (21 April 1997) at 9976 (statement of Minister of
Justice, Hon. Alan Rock, that in the context of investigations of criminal organizations, wiretapping is "almost always the last resort" and that police should thus not have to "go through
the empty process of establishing it").

81.

Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 16.2. See also Martin L. Friedland, "Police
Powers in Bill C-36" in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & KentRoach, eds., The Security ofFreedom: Essays on Canada'sAnti- Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2001) 269 at 274.

82.

See Whirling, supra note 39.

83.

CriminalCode, supra note 21, ss. 185(1.1), 186(1.1).
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(a) an offence under sections 83.02 to 83.04 or 83.18 to 83.23 of the Criminal
Code;
(b) an indictable federal offence "committed for the benefit of, at the direction of
or in association with a terrorist group";
(c) an indictable federal offence which "also constitutes a terrorist activity"; or
(d) conspiracies, attempts, counselling, and being an accessory after the fact in re84
lation any of the above offences.

The offences listed in (a) capture activities far removed from the causing of actual
harm. Sections 83.02 through 83.04 prohibit the provision, collection, making
available, use, or possession of property or financial or "other" services, knowing
that it will be used, at least in part, for terrorist purposes. Sections 83.18 through
83.23 prohibit, inter alia, various forms of secondary participation in terrorist offences, including participating in or contributing to "any activity of a terrorist
group"; facilitating a terrorist activity; instructing another person to "carry out any
activity for the benefit, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group";
and harbouring or concealing a person who has "carried out a terrorist activity."
Notably, a person may be convicted of participating in or contributing" to
a terrorist group even if no terrorist activity actually occurs, the person's contribution does not enhance the group's ability to carry out an offence, or the person
does not know the specific nature of any terrorist activity that may be carried out."
The "instructing" offence may capture general public admonitions to engage in
terrorism.87 Similarly, a person may be convicted of facilitating a terrorist activ-

84. Ibid., s. 2.
85. The definition of "participating or contributing" is also very broad and includes "entering or
remaining in any country," and "making oneself... available to facilitate" a terrorist offence.
Ibid., s. 83.18(3).
86. Ibid., s. 83.18(2). See also Khawaja 2006, supra note 6 at para. 39 ("[i]t is unnecessary that
an accused be shown to have knowledge of the specific nature of terrorist activity he intends
to aid, support, enhance or facilitate, as long as he knows it is terrorist activity in a general
way"); R. v. Khawaja (2008), 238 C.C.C. (3d) 114 at para. 80 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [Khawaja
20081.
87. See Kent Roach, September 11: Consequencesfor Canada(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003) at 44; Forcese, supra note 23 at 286-87.
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ity even if no such activity was actually foreseen, planned, or carried out, and
even if the person did not know that any particular activity was facilitated.'
The offences in (b) and (c) hinge on the Code's definition of "terrorist activity."" This definition is also expansive and includes any act or omission
committed with the intention of intimidating the public with respect to its security, including "economic security,"" or "compelling a person, government
or ... organization to do or to refrain from doing any act,"" and that intentionally creates either a risk to public safety or causes "serious interference with or
serious disruption of an essential public service, facility, or system."" It also includes any conspiracy, attempt, counselling, or threat to commit any such act
or omission, as well as being an accessory after the fact. As noted, all of these
offences must be indictable federal crimes. Such crimes include, however, all
hybrid offences that the Crown may choose to prosecute by way of summary
conviction," including minor offences like mischief," theft under five thousand
dollars," and common assault."
By adding various forms of inchoate and secondary liability to the list, category (d) further expands the breadth of activity exempted from the investigative
necessity requirement." As discussed, many of the offences in categories (a) to
(c) already prohibit acts that may be only dimly, potentially, or indirectly related
CriminalCoae, supra note 21, s. 83.19. See also Khawaja 2008, supra note 86 at para. 139.
89. This is because "terrorist group" is defined, inter alia, as "an entity that has as one of its purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity." CriminalCode, ibid., s.
83.01(1).
90. The inherent vagueness of this phrase is highlighted in Kent Roach, "Terrorism Offences
and the CharterA Comment on R. v. Khawaja" (2007) 11 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 271 at 28384 [Roach, "Terrorism Offences"].
88.

91.
92.
93.

As Kent Roach has noted, "I] t is a stretch to define terrorism to include attempts to compel
individuals or corporations to act." Ibid. at 298.
CriminalCode, supra note 21, s. 83.01(1). An exception is made for "advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work" not intended to endanger public safety. Ibid.
InterpretationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 34(1)(a).

94.

CriminalCode, supra note 21, s. 430(3).

95.

Ibid., s. 334(b)

96.

Ibid., s. 266.

97.

See Maureen Webb, "Essential Liberty or a Little Temporary Safety? The Review of the Canadian Anti-terrorismAct" (2006) 51 Crim. L.Q. 53 at 65.
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to the causing of serious harm. Coupling these offences with inchoate liability
threatens to capture conduct carrying an even more negligible risk of harm."
My point is not to question either the wisdom" or constitutionality'o of
these offences. It is simply to show that the investigative necessity exemption
applies to a great deal of low-level (or even marginal) criminal activity.'0 ' Police
may thus intercept the communications of unsophisticated suspects who would
have been vulnerable to conventional investigative techniques." 2 Without the
investigative necessity requirement, such surveillance may be justified solely by
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of one of the designated offences
will be uncovered.
The next question, then, is whether the interception of terrorist suspects'
communications, when it is not strictly necessary to do so, violates section 8. In
my view, it does. Without investigative necessity, there is a substantially greater
risk that police will disproportionately and unfairly conduct surveillance of
Muslim and Arab Canadians. When an enactment invades privacy in a roughly
equitable way or when it disproportionately harms politically powerful segments of society, judges should be reluctant to intervene, even if they dislike
it.' 3 In such cases, the matter should usually be left to the legislative process to

98.

See Forcese, supra note 23 at 28; Roach, "Terrorism Offences," supra note 90 at 284, n. 33. See
also R. v. Diry, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 669 (refusing to recognize offence of attempted conspiracy).

99.

For commentary on these issues, see Forcese, ibid. at 263-89; Roach, "Terrorism Offences,"
ibid.; W. Wesley Pue, "The War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare?" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 267 at 271-74; David Paciocco, "Constitutional
Casualties of September 11: Limiting the Legacy of the Anti-terrorismAct" (2002) 16 Sup.
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 185; Webb, supra note 97 at 61-69; and Stanley Cohen, "Safeguards in and
Justifications for Canada's New Anti-terrorismAct" (2002-2003) 14 N.J.C.L. 99 at 119-22.

100. In Khawaja 2006, supra note 6, the court rejected a variety of constitutional challenges to
these provisions, save for striking down the requirement to prove that the act was committed
"in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause."
CriminalCode, supra note 21, s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A).
101. Note that the terrorist offences definitions in the CriminalCode are broader than equivalent
definitions in comparable jurisdictions and international instruments. See Table 7.1 in
Forcese, supra note 23 at 265-66.
102. See Whirling, supra note 39 at 118-19.
103. See Orin S. Kerr, "The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution" (2004) 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801 at 839-58 [Kerr, "The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies"]; Ronald F. Wright, "Parity of Resources for Defense
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory" (2004) 90 Iowa L. Rev. 219 at 254-60;
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sort out. Judicial intervention is more justified, in contrast, when the enactment
disproportionately harms groups whose interests were unreasonably discounted
in that process."o'
Most innocent Canadians have little reason to fear that police will intercept
their electronic communications. Canadians with Muslim or Arab backgrounds
may not be as confident."'s The "profiling"' of these groups by national security
investigators could have a variety of pernicious effects, including the alienation
and radicalization of suspects who are innocent of any criminal or terrorist in-

James Stribopoulos, "In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the
Charter" (2005) 31 Queen's L.J. 1 at 47-48; Penney, "Reasonable Expectations," supra note
11 at 503-05; and William J. Stuntz, "Accountable Policing" (Harvard Public Law Working
Paper No. 130, 2006), at 19, 53, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170>.
104. See John Hart Ely, Democracy andDistrust:A Theory offudicialReview (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980) at 172-73; William J. Stuntz, "The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law" (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505; Donald A. Dripps, "Criminal Procedure, Footnote
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the
Rights of the Accused?" (1993) 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079; Richard C. Worf, "The Case for.
Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures" (2007) 23 Touro L.
Rev. 93 at 138-58; and Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, "The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory" (1988) 77 Geo. L.J. 19 at 92-112.
105. For evidence of-and commentary on-the disproportionate targeting of Muslim and Arab
Canadians in national security investigations, see Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report ofthe Events Relating to
Maher Arar: Analysis andRecommendations (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services
Canada, 2006) at 355-58 (Commissioner: Dennis R. O'Connor); Arar Inquiry, RCMP and
NationalSecurity, supra note 7 at 18-20; Khawaja 2006, supra note 6 at para. 53; Kent
Roach, "Ten Ways to Improve Canadian Anti-Terrorism Law" (2006) 51 Crim. L.Q. 102 at
122-23; and Teem Bahdi, "No Exit: Racial Profiling and Canada's War Against Terrorism"
(2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293.
106. Canadian courts have increasingly recognized both the phenomenon of discriminatory profiling and the importance of instituting ex ante and ex post checks on police discretion in
combating it. See e.g. R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 369 at para. 85; R. v. Brown (2003), 9
C.R. (6th) 240 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Harris (2007), 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at para. 63 (Ont.
C.A.). See generally David M. Tanovich, The Colour offustice: PolicingRace in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) (reviewing evidence of racial profiling in Canada); Jerry Kang,
"Trojan Horses of Race" (2004) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 at 1499-1520 (reviewing experimental psychological and other empirical evidence of the subtlety and pervasiveness of racial
stereotyping).
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volvement.' 07 By ensuring that an exceptionally intrusive police power is only
used when there is no reasonable alternative, investigative necessity helps to
minimize these harms.
At the same time, requiring police to demonstrate investigative necessity is
unlikely to thwart surveillance of truly dangerous targets. Many comparable jurisdictions have imposed investigative necessity as a statutory or super-statutory condition of electronic surveillance without exempting terrorism investigations.1 08
And, as discussed in Part II(A), below, CSIS agents must always show investigative
necessity to conduct communications surveillance."' There is no evidence that this
prerequisite has hampered CSIS's efforts to monitor suspected terrorists;"o it is difficult to see why this would be different in the context of the Code.
The courts should thus confirm that communications surveillance is not
reasonable under section 8 of the Charter without investigative necessity, and
accordingly strike down the reference to terrorism offences in sections 185(1.1)
and 186(1.1) of the Code.

II. CSIS
A. CONTEXT AND LEGISLATION
CSIS was established in 1984". in the aftermath of a Royal Commission report
detailing abuse and incompetence in the RCMP's national security activities."'
107. See Tom Tyler, Stephen J. Schulfhofer & Aziz R. Huq, "Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects
in Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans" (2010) 44 Law & Soc'y Rev.
365; Penney, "Reasonable Expectations," supra note 11 at 492-500; Tracey Maclin, "'Black
and Blue Encounters' - Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures:
Should Race Matter?" (1991) 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243; and Ontario Human Rights Commission, Paying the Price: The Human Cost ofRacialProfiling(Inquiry Report) (Toronto: Ontario
Human Rights Commission, 2003), online:
<http://www.ohrc.on.calen/resources/discussion-consultation/RacialProfileReportEN>.
108. See e.g. Interception of Communications Act 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 56, s. 2(3); Omnibus Crime
Controland Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. %§ 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c); and K/ass v. Federal
Republic ofGermany (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 214.
109. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
110. See e.g. Michelle Shephard, "Much at Stake in Terror Case" Toronto Star (10 June 2006)
A14; San Grewal, "CSIS Erased Crucial Tapes; Rivalry Between RCMP, Spy Agency Hobbled Probe Suspect's Phone Tapped Months Before Bombings" Toronto Star (17 March
2005) A9.
111. An Act to establish the CanadianSecurity Intelligence Service, S.C. 1984, c. 31 [CSIS Act].
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CSIS is a civilian entity, and its agents accordingly have no special powers to arrest,
lay charges, or use force. Rather, the agency's purpose is to gather and analyze
intelligence relating to "threats to the security of Canada.""' "Threats to the
security of Canada" means
(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of
Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,
(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental
to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to
any person,
(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the
threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose
of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and
(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of,
the constitutionally established system of government in Canada, but does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with
any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d).114

Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary to investigate one of these threats, CSIS agents may apply for a judicial warrant author112. McDonald Commission, supra note 20. See also Atwalv. Canada, [1988] 1 F.C. 107 at 13940 (C.A.) [Atwal].
113. CSISAct, supra note 111, s. 2. This information may be passed on to the RCMP or other
police agencies for enforcement purposes. Specifically, s. 17 of the CSISAce permits the
agency, on ministerial approval, to "enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate" with
federal and provincial governments and police agencies. Section 19(2) also specifies that the
agency may disclose information "obtained in the performance of its duties and functions"
to, inter alia, police "where the information may be used in the investigation or prosecution
of an alleged contravention of any law of Canada or a province." Such disclosures must be
reported to the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). See infira, notes 143-47 and
accompanying text; CSIS Act, s. 19(3). As noted by the Arar Inquiry, "as a result of post 9/11
legislative changes, most, if not all, actions which affect the national security of Canada have
been criminalized"; consequently, "virtually all information and intelligence that CSIS would
be interested in is potentially also of interest to the RCMP in connection with its national
security, crime prevention, and law enforcement mandate." Arar Inquiry, RCMP andNational Security, supra note 7 at 41. See also Cohen, Privacy, Crime and Terror,supra note 23
at 407-08; Charkaoui,supra note 5 at para. 27.
114. CSIS Act. ibid.. s. 2.
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izing the interception of "any communication."1s To this end, its agents may
be authorized to "enter any place or open or obtain access to any thing"; "search
for, remove or return, or examine, take extracts from or make copies of or record
in any other manner the information, record, document or thing"; and "install,
maintain or remove any thing."".
In many ways, this regime protects privacy at least as robustly as part VI of
the Code.117 For example, warrant applications that are made under the CSIS Act
must be approved by the responsible minister, 1 8 made by certain designated.
officials, and heard by a federally-appointed judge."' Most notably, the CSIS
Act requires applicants to demonstrate investigative necessity for all warrants,
including the equivalent of ordinary Code search warrants.12 0 There is no exception for terrorism investigations.
In some respects, however, the CSIS Act offers less protection than part VI
of the Code. There is no requirement to inform targets or report to parliament; 121
CSIS intercepts may last for up to one year1 22 (though, as we have seen, this is
now also the case for criminal organization and terrorism investigations under
part VI), and CSIS warrant applicants do not have to show that an offence has
been committed or that evidence is likely to be obtained. There need only be
reasonable grounds to believe that the warrant "is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or perform its duties and
functions under section 16. 1123

115. Ibid., ss. 21(1), (3).
116. Ibid., s. 21(3).
117. See ibid., ss. 21(2), (4).
118. Ibid., s. 21(1).
119. Ibid., s. 21. The applicant must be either the director of CSIS or an employee designated by
the minister. The judge must be a judge of the Federal Court (Canada) who is designated to
hear CSIS warrant applications by the chief justice of that court.
120. Ibid., ss. 21(2)(b), 21(3). This requirement had been recommended by the McDonald
Commission, supra note 20 at 526, n. 56.
121. See CSIS Act, ibid., s. 26 (specifying that part VI of the CriminalCode does not apply to authorized CSIS intercepts).
122. In "subversion" investigations (defined in s. 2(d) of the Act), a sixty-day maximum applies.
Like CriminalCode authorizations, CSISAct warrants are renewable. CSISAct, ibid., ss.
21(5), 22.
123. Ibid., s. 21(1).
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B. CONSTITUTIONALITY
It is this latter aspect of the CSIS Aces warrant procedure that is constitutionally problematic. On its face, it does not satisfy the Court's directive in Hunter
that investigators establish reasonable grounds "to believe that an offence has
been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the
search."1' As we have seen, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that
national security concerns might justify a different standard.125 The CSIS Act
does require reasonable grounds,"' but this requirement is in relation to the
belief that surveillance is necessary to investigate national security threats, not
in relation to any belief that it is necessary to discover evidence of an offence.
In the only decision to date that has fully considered the question, the
Federal Court of Appeal nonetheless concluded that the CSIS warrant provi127
Communications surveillance
sions complied with section 8 of the Charter.
serves different purposes, the court stressed, in the criminal law enforcement
and national security contexts. "The Code contemplates interception as an investigative tool after or during the event," it reasoned, "while the [CSIS] Act is
directed primarily to gathering information in an attempt to anticipate future
occurrences."128 Consequently, it would be inappropriate, in the latter case, to
insist that the issuing judge "be satisfied that an offence has been committed
and that evidence thereof will be found in execution of the warrant. "129

124. Supra note 10 at 168.
125. Ibid
126. Supra note 111, s. 21(1). The specific language used is "reasonable grounds," but as noted,
the courts have treated this phrase as having the same meaning as "reasonable and probable
grounds" or "probable cause." See supra note 33.
127. Atwal, supra note 112 at 131-34. See also CanadianCivil LibertiesAssn. v. Canada (Attorney
General), (1997) 126 C.C.C. (3d) 257 at para. 88 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1998 S.C.C.A. No. 487 [CCLA] (noting, in denying standing on other grounds,
that the applicant's s. 8 arguments were so weak that there was "probably" no serious issue of
invalidity).
128. Atwal, ibid. at 127.
129. Ibid. at 133. In Atwal, however, the court did hold that the judge who issued the warrant
erred in refusing to disclose the affidavit supporting the warrant to its target, who had applied to that judge under Federal Court Rules to vacate the warrant. According to Atwal,
such disclosure should generally follow unless the government establishes under applicable
evidentiary legislation that the disclosure would be damaging to the national security interest
(at 143-44). The government may also be able to assert other forms of statutory and com-
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It is difficult to take issue with this analysis. CSIS's main purpose is not
to investigate and collect evidence of crime. While other agencies may ultimately
use information acquired by CSIS in criminal investigations and prosecutions,
CSIS's mandate is to collect "security intelligence," not "criminal intelligence." 30
There is a risk that CSIS could systematically deploy its search and surveillance
powers to bolster the somewhat more limited powers available to law enforcement
agencies."' This risk is best mitigated, however, by independent oversight,13 2
not by requiring CSIS to search and conduct surveillance only in relation to
discrete, criminal investigations. Doing so would unduly hamper the agency's
ability to conduct long-term, proactive, and preventative monitoring of security threats.
The Act's definition of such threats, moreover, is reasonably restrictive.
Most terrorism-related investigations would fall within the scope of paragraph
(c) of the definition of "threats to the security of Canada." Obtaining a warrant
in such cases would require reasonable grounds to believe that the intrusion was
necessary to enable the investigation of activities "directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property
for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective."13
CSIS may only conduct intrusive surveillance, therefore, when it can demonstrate a serious risk of harm.
Atwal was not unanimous. In his dissenting reasons, Justice Hugessen faulted
the CSIS Act for failing to require any direct connection "between the information
it is hoped to obtain from the intercepted communication and the alleged threat to

mon law privilege (such as informer or public interest privilege) to prevent disclosure. See R.
v. Malik, [2002] B.C.J. No. 3219 (S.C.) (QL) (negligent destruction of wiretap recording
held to violate disclosure obligation under s. 7 of the Charter). See generally Charkaoui,supra
note 5 at paras. 58-61; Suresh v. Canada (Ministerof Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1
S.C.R. 3 at para. 122; Ruhy v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 43-51;
Canada (Ministerof Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [ 19921 1 S.C.R. 711 at 744;
Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 12.8.1-4; and Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-5, ss. 37-38.16.
130. See Arar Inquiry, RCMP and National Security, supra note 7 at 26-27.
131. See generally Balkin, supra note 2 at 11-12.
132. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
133. CSISAct, supra note 111, s. 2(c) [emphasis added]. Roach, "Terrorism Offences," supra note
90 at 295-96.
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the security of Canada."' All that is needed, in his view, is a connection between
the interception and the investigation itself. This would allow CSIS to target innocent people, such as the intended victims of a terrorist attack, or worse, persons
who could be compelled to become informants (by threatening to disclose damaging information)."'
Justice Hugessen's fears are greatly exaggerated. If it is reasonably possible, statutes must be interpreted in a constitutional manner.'3 6 As discussed,
though section 8 does not require mandatory minimization provisions, undue
invasions of the privacy of non-suspects may be unreasonable in individual
cases.' Section 8 also clothes judges with a residual discretion to refuse to issue
a warrant, even where the statutory requirements for issuance have been met.'
In exercising this discretion, judges must weigh the interests of individuals to be
"free of intrusions of the state [against those of the state] to intrude on the privacy of the individual for the purpose of law enforcement."' In light of these
principles, it makes little sense to invalidate a warrant provision because it
does not expressly forbid intrusions that would inevitably be found to violate
the Charter."o
The greatest problem with the CSIS Act's investigative powers is not their
breadth; rather, it is the secrecy accompanying their exercise. The few reported
decisions suggest that authorizing judges take their supervisory role seriously."'
But as the Act contains no notice requirement, and as investigations rarely lead
134. Atwal, supra note 112 at 151.
135. Ibid.
136. See Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
137. Supra note 73.
138. Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416.
139. Ibid. at 435.
140. See generally Applicationfr warrantspursuant to s. 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Act (1997) 10 C.R. (5th) 273 (F.C.T.D.) (stressing the importance of careful judicial scrutiny in assessing CSIS warrant applications).
141. In addition to the cases cited at supra note 127, see Canada, Security Intelligence Review
Committee, SIRCAnnual Report 2005-2006 An operationalreview ofthe CanadianSecurity
Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2007) at 48-49
(noting the dismissal of two applications as well as several instances where the judge requested additional information before issuing the warrant).
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to criminal proceedings, it is difficult to know whether the process is working
as it should. 162
To help alleviate this problem, while at the same time accommodating the
need for secrecy in national security matters, the Act establishes the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), an independent oversight body.'" As part
of its responsibilities, SIRC investigates and reports on CSIS's use of its warrant
powers."" Specifically, SIRC reviews a sample of warrants to determine whether
the application accurately reflected the information held, the justification for requesting the warrant was reasonable, and CSIS complied with the legal and policy requirements attaching to warrant powers.'" While some have suggested
1
that CSIS should be subjected to a greater degree of parliamentary oversight, "
most commentators have concluded that SIRC is effective in holding CSIS accountable.'4 In my view, the combination of this oversight and a rigorous judicial
4
warrant process renders the CSISAct compatible with section 8 of the Charter.'1
142. See Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 12.3-4. The same problem has been noted
with respect to the RCMP's use of its investigative powers in national security investigations,
and led to Justice O'Connor's recommendation that the government provide effective monitoring of national security bodies. See Arar Inquiry, RCMP and NationalSecurity, supra note
7 at 33-35.
143. CSISAct, supra note 111, ss. 34-55. See generally Murray Rankin, "The Security Intelligence
Review Committee: Reconciling National Security with Procedual Fairness" (1990) 3 Can.
J. Admin. L. & Pol'y 173 at 177-79. Another oversight mechanism, the office of the CSIS
"Inspector General," is charged with monitoring the agency's operational activities. CSIS Act,
ss. 29-33.
144. See Reg Whitaker, "Designing a Balance Between Freedom and Security" in Joseph F.
Fletcher, ed., Ideas in Action: Essays on Politics and Law in Honour ofPeter Russell (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999) 126 at 135. SIRC's annual reports, which contain reviews and statistics on the use of the warrant powers, are available online: <http://www.
sirc-csars.gc.calanrran/index-eng.html>.
145. See Canada, Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRCAnnual Report 2006-2007: An
operationalreview of the CanadianSecurity Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2007) at v, 52-53.
146. See Whitaker, supra note 144 at 144-45; Jean-Paul Brodeur, "The Invention of Outsiders:
The Relationship between Operatives and Civilian Experts" in Fletcher, supra note 144, 150
at 163-64.
147. See Whitaker, ibid.; Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 12.4.
148. See generally CCLA, supra note 127 at paras. 14, 73 (taking note of SIRC's role in suggesting
that the Act's warrant powers likely do not violate the Charter).
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III. CSEC
A.

CONTEXT AND LEGISLATION

CSEC"'9 is charged with collecting "signals intelligence."'o This includes the covert acquisition and processing of foreign electronic communications for the purpose of advancing the nation's interests in defence, security, and international
relations.' These intercepts are typically "processed through arrays of advanced
computer systems programmed to search for specific telephone numbers or
internet addresses, voice recognition patterns or key words, and to decrypt text."152
CSEC was established in 1975, but predecessor agencies had been capturing
and decrypting foreign communications for many decades.' Shortly after World
War II, a signals intelligence sharing alliance that is still active today was created
by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.'"' CSEC and its immediate predecessor, the Communications Branch of
149. CSEC is a civilian unit of the Department of National Defence. Administrative and financial
matters are controlled by the Department; however, policy direction comes from the National Security Advisor, a Deputy Secretary in the Privy Council Office. See Martin Rudner,
"Canada's Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization"
(2001) 16 Intelligence & Nat'l Security 97 at 97 [Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment").
150. "Signals intelligence" has been defined as "a category of intelligence that includes transmissions associated with communications, radars, and weapons systems." National Security
Agency, "Signals Intelligence," online: National Security Agency Central Security Service
<http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/index.shtml>.
151. The Canadian military also conducts signals intelligence in support of its operations. It is not
authorized to conduct domestic surveillance, except in aid of another agency, in which case
its activities are subject to the regulatory regime governing that agency. See Arar Inquiry,
RCMP and NationalSecurity, supra note 7 at 72; Forcese, supra note 23 at 453.
152. Martin Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence
and Counter-Terrorism" (2007) 22 Intelligence and Nat'l Security 473 at 474 [Rudner,
"Signals Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism"].
153. See Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment," supra note 149 at 99-114.
154. Ibid. at 108-09; Christopher Andrew, "The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance" in Hayden B. Peake & Samuel Halpern, eds., In the Name ofIntelligence: Essays in
Honor of Walter Porzheimer (Washington: NIBC Press, 1994) 95. The centrepiece of this alliance is a large-scale, sophisticated computer network enabling the automated processing
and sharing of information relevant to each nation's intelligence requirements. See Rudner,
"Signals Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism," supra note 152 at 111-14, 479-82; Martin
Rudner, "The Globalization of Terrorism: Canada's Intelligence Response to the Post-
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the National Research Council, participated actively in this alliance, and during
the Cold War era, they directed most of their intercepts at the Soviet Bloc.'"
Clothed in secrecy, the government did not formally acknowledge their existence
until 1983;'. they operated without any statutory mandate.' They were prohibited, however, from intercepting communications within Canada.'
The enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001 changed much of this.'
CSEC was given a statutory home in a new part of the NationalDefence Act,'
which defined the agency's mandate to include the acquisition and use of "in-

September 11 Threat Environment" CanadianIssues (September 2002) 24. It has been reported that the agreement governing the alliance prohibits signatories from targeting each
other's territory or nationals. See Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment," ibid. at 479. The CSEC Commissioner has provided assurances that the agency "does
not use its partners to circumvent the laws of Canada, nor does it provide partners with
communications they could not legally collect for themselves." Canada, Communications
Security Establishment Commissioner, Annual Report: 2000-2001 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2001) at 4.
155. See Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment," ibid. at 99; Philip Rosen,
The CommunicationsSecurity Establishment: Canada'sMost Secret Intelligence Agency, Parliamentary Research Branch, Background Paper BP-343E (September 1993) at 2-3.
156. See Senate, Special Committee on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Proceedings (22
September 1983) at 11 (Jean-Luc P6pin). Informal acknowledgments of Canada's participation in the UK/US Agreement were made as early as 1975. See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Miscellaneous Estimates, Proceedings (24 March 1975) at 18 (C.M. Drury).
157. Until 2001, Canada's signal intelligence agencies operated under the mandate of a classified
order-in-council. See Rudner, "Signals Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism," supra note 152
at 474.
158. Before 2001, neither the CriminalCode nor any other statute exempted CSEC from the
Code's prohibition on the interception of private communications originating or terminating
in Canada. See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, "Rights, Limits, Security: A Comprehensive Review of the Anti-terrorism Act
and Related Issues" in FinalReport ofthe Standing Committee on PublicSafety andNational
Security (March 2007) at 53, online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/
391/secu/reports/rp2798914/sterrp07/sterrp07-e.pdf>. However, former CSEC agents have
alleged that, before 2001, the agency sometimes intercepted private communications in Canada, including communications between Quebec separatists and the government of France.
See Nomi Morris, "Inside Canada's Most Secret Agency" Maclean's 109:36 (9 February
1996) 32.
159. Supra note 4, s. 102.
160. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, part V.1 [NationalDefence Act].

PENNEY, NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE

277

formation from the global information infrastructure""' to provide "foreign
intelligence."16 2 Consistent with past practice, the legislation does not regulate the
interception of non-Canadians' communications that are occurring wholly outside Canada.'63 It does, however, prevent the targeting of "Canadians or any
person in Canada.".. To account for the possibility that information about such
persons may nonetheless be acquired incidental to foreign-directed surveillance,
the statute also requires CSEC to take "measures to protect the privacy of Canadians in the use and retention of intercepted information.""' The nature of
these measures is not specified, but CSEC uses the following protocol to comply with this mandate:
[information about Canadians] may only be retained if it is assessed as essential to the
understanding of the foreign intelligence, and it may be included in foreign intelligence
reporting if it is suppressed (i.e., replaced by a generic reference such as "a Canadian
person"). When receiving a subsequent request for disclosure of the details of the suppressed information, CSEC requires federal government departments and agencies to
explain their authority to collect this information under their own respective mandates

161. Section 273.61 of the NationalDefence Act defines "global information infrastructure" to
include "electromagnetic emissions, communications systems, information technology systems and networks, and any data or technical information carried on, contained in or relating to those emissions, systems or networks." Ibid
162. Section 273.61 of the NationalDefenceAct defines "foreign intelligence" to mean "information or intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual,
state, organization or terrorist group, as they relate to international affairs, defence or security." Ibid. Section 273.64 of the National Defence Act also directs the agency to help to protect "electronic information" and."information infrastructures" of "importance to the
Government of Canada" and "provide technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies in the performance of their lawful duties." Notably, section
273.64(1)(c) of the NationalDefenceAct does not give the agency any powers to assist in fulfilling the latter mandate, and it specifically directs that any such assistance is "subject to any
limitations imposed by law on federal law enforcement and security agencies." See Forcese,
supra note 23 at 453-54.
163. This follows from the use of the phrase "private communication," which is defined as having
the same meaning as in s. 183 of the CriminalCode, supra note 21. NationalDefence Act,
ibid., s. 273.61. See also Canada, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner,
Annual Report: 2003-2004 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services
Canada, 2006) at 6 [AnnualReport: 2003-2004].
164. NationalDefence Act, ibid., s. 273.64(2).
165. Ibid.
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and to provide an operational justification of their need to know this information. If
66
these conditions are met, CSEC may release the suppressed information.1

Though the Anti-terrorism Act forbids CSEC from targeting Canadians,
whether here or abroad, it breaks with the previous regime in permitting the
surveillance of communications in Canada as a by-product of intercepts directed
at foreign targets. Specifically, the responsible minister"' "may, for the sole purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence, authorize the Communications Security
Establishment in writing to intercept private communications in relation to an
activity or class of activities specified in the authorization."' The authorization
may only issue if the Minister is satisfied that
a.

the interception will be directed at foreign entities located outside Canada;

b.

the information to be obtained could not reasonably be obtained by other
means;

C.

the expected foreign intelligence value of the information that would be derived from the interception justifies it; and

d.

satisfactory measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians and to
ensure that private communications will only be used or retained if they are
essential to international affairs, defence or security.

Such authorizations may persist for up to one year and are renewable for further
one-year periods.' 70 As with CSIS warrants, there is no notification requirement.

166. Canada, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Annual Report: 2007-2008
(Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2008) at 10 [Annual
Report. 2007-2008].
167. "Minister" is defined as "the Minister of National Defence or such other member of the
Queen's Privy Council asmay be designated by the Governor in Council to be responsible
for the Communications Security Establishment." NationalDefenceAct, supra note 160,
s. 273.61.
168. Ibid., ss. 273.65(1), 273.65(3). Section 273.69 of the NationalDefence Act states that "Part
VI of the CriminalCode does not apply in relation to an interception of a communication
under the authority of an authorization issued under this Part or in relation to a communication so intercepted."
169. Ibid., s. 273.65(2). The minister may also impose "any conditions that the Minister considers advisable to protect the privacy of Canadians, including additional measures to restrict
the use and retention of, the access to, and the form and manner of disclosure of, information derived from the private communications." Ibid. s. 273.65(5).
170. Ibid, s. 273.68.
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B. CONSTITUTIONALITY
As of yet, there are no decisions interpreting these provisions or deciding their
constitutionality. Section 8 of the Charteris not likely engaged by purely foreign
surveillance, i.e., where none of the parties to the communication is either Canadian or in Canada.' So long as reasonable measures are taken to prevent it,
it is also unlikely that the unintentional capture of communications of Canadians abroad would violate section 8.172
The situation is very different when there is a reasonable likelihood that one
of the parties to the communication is in Canada. When such a communication
is intercepted, the surveillance invades a reasonable expectation of privacy by
definition, and the protection of section 8 is triggered.17 ' There are good reasons
to think, however, that foreign intelligence intercepts should operate under a
different set of rules than criminal wiretaps. There is no doubt that a robust
communications surveillance capacity is needed to combat the threats of foreign and foreign-influenced terrorism."' Further, as discussed in relation to the
CSIS Act, national security investigations are often less targeted and more preventative than conventional criminal investigations. Advances in communications
technology, including the move from circuit to packet-switched communications
and the globalization of telecommunications infrastructure, require further departures from the orthodox, part VI model of wiretap regulation.175

171. See Schreiber v. Canada(Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 at paras. 19-25, Lamer C.J.,
concurring (no reasonable expectation of privacy in foreign banking records). Note as well
that purely foreign communications fall outside the definition of "private communication"
in the CriminalCode, supra note 21, part VI. See supra note 26.
172. See Thompson, supra note 12 at para. 113 (noting that the interception of the communications of non-targeted people is "an unfortunate cost of electronic surveillance").
173. See Hunter; supra note 10.
174. See generally Richard Posner, "Commentary: A New Surveillance Act" Wall Street Journal
(15 February 2006) A16. There is some evidence that, in recent years, CSEC has played a
role in collecting communications aiding the detection and disruption of Al-Qaeda-inspired
terrorist cells in Canada and elsewhere. See Rudner, "Signals Intelligence and CounterTerrorism," supra note 152 at 482-83.
175. See Orin S. Kerr, "Updating the ForeignIntelligence SurveillanceAct" (2008) 75 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 225 at 233-36, 243 [Kerr, "Updating"]; K.A. Taipale, "The Ear of Dionysus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance" (2007) 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 128 at 143-50; and Annual
Report 2003-2004, supra note 163 at 6.
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It thus makes sense that CSEC warrants should be granted for "an activity or
class of activities specified in the authorization" as opposed to a discrete, targetcentered investigation."' This phraseology should be interpreted to encompass
content filtering, traffic analysis, pattern analysis, data mining, and other staples of
twenty-first century surveillance." To comply with its statutory mandate and section 8 of the Charter, in using these techniques CSEC should have to show that it
has adopted measures minimizing the risk of invading the privacy of innocent Canadians, such as access controls, rule-based processing, anonymization and selective revelation, addressing false positives, and audit and accountability functions.'
Similarly, it is appropriate that CSEC surveillance is not conditioned on
reasonable grounds to believe that any particular target is a terrorist or an agent
of a foreign power. In the context of transnational digital communications
networks, investigators cannot always be expected to know the identity or location of their targets."' As the relevant provisions specify, it is reasonable that
CSEC justify proposed intercepts with reference to their expected "foreign intelligence value.""a CSEC should be permitted to show, for example, that a
particular surveillance technique (say, the use of certain pattern recognition
software to analyze data passing through certain internet switches) is likely to
reveal valuable intelligence."'
176. NationalDefenceAct, supra note 160, s. 273.65(1). This interpretation of this provision appears to accord with the interpretation proffered by the Department of Justice, and applied
by CSEC. See generally infra note 198 and accompanying text. It differs from the interpretation favoured by the CSEC Commissioner, who has argued that "activity or class of activities" refers to the activities of surveillance targets. See Annual Report. 2007-2008, supra note
166 at 4; Canada, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Annual Report:
2005-2006 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2006) at 9-11 [Annual Report.
2005-2006].
177. See Taipale, supra note 175 at 150-55; Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M.
Schwartz, "Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological
Approaches" (2008) 75 U. Chicago L. Rev. 261.
178. See Rubinstein, Lee & Schwartz, ibid. at 266-70. These measures are analogous to the various minimization tools that may be required of traditional wiretap authorizations to comply
with section 8. See generally supra note 73.
179. See Balkin, supra note 2 at 18; Paul M. Schwartz, "Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA Reform,
and the Lessons of Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes's Jorde Lecture" (2009) 97 Cal.
L. Rev. 407 at 419.
180. NationalDefence Act, supra note 160, s. 273.65(2).
181. See Kerr, "Updating," supra note 175 at 16-17.
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However, it is difficult to see how the absence of a judicial authorization
requirement, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances, 18 2 could be reasonable under section 8. Ministerial authorization, of course, is not the same
as judicial authorization. As Justice Dickson explained in Hunter,
The purpose of a requirement of prior authorization is to provide an opportunity,
before the event, for the conflicting interests of the state and the individual to be
assessed, so that the individual's right to privacy will be breached only where the
appropriate standard has been met, and the interests of the state are thus demonstrably superior. For such an authorization procedure to be meaningful it is necessary for the person authorizing the search to be able to assess the evidence as to
whether that standard has been met, in an entirely neutral and impartial manner.
... The person performing this function need not be a judge, but he must at a
183
minimum be capable of acting judicially.

In other words, the person deciding whether to allow the intrusion must be independent of the state's investigative machinery. A minister of the government,
especially one responsible for the operations of an investigative agency, cannot
fulfill this role.

It is true that courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with the
executive's power in matters of national defence and foreign relations." The
deference that courts rightly afford the government in this domain, however,
is not unlimited.' As David Dyzenhaus has written, whatever the threat of international terrorism, the rule of law demands that judges check "each particular provision or act of discretion" for compliance with governing norms.'
It might also be argued that there is a "diminished" expectation of privacy
in electronic communications flowing across Canada's borders. It is true that
in other transborder contexts, such as immigration and customs, courts have
182. As in the criminal law context, warrantless national security surveillance may be justified (at
least temporarily) by exigent circumstances. See generally Charkaoui,supra note 5 at para. 24
(noting that, in the national security context, "the executive branch of government may be
required to act quickly, without recourse, at least in the first instance, to the judicial procedures normally required for the deprivation of liberty or security of the person").
183. Hunter, supra note 10 at 161-62.
184. See generally Canada(PrimeMinister) v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 at paras. 2, 33-39
[Khadr].
185. See generally Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
186. David Dyzenhaus, "The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers be Normalized?" in Daniels, Macklem & Roach, supra note 81, 21 at 32.
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countenanced warrantless searches of persons, vehicles, and goods.' Imposing
a warrant requirement in these circumstances would severely curtail the state's
ability to prevent dangerous persons and substances from entering Canada.'
As noted by the Court in R. v. Simmons, "travellers seeking to cross national
boundaries fully expect to be subject to a screening process."' It is doubtful,
however, that Canadians reasonably expect their international telephone and
other electronic communications to be monitored by the state without judicial
authorization. Such communications are much more ubiquitous, and their interception much more invasive, than searches of persons and goods crossing the
nation's borders. As mentioned, the strength of the privacy interest in domestic-foreign electronic communications is recognized in the Criminal Code,
which requires the police to obtain warrants to perform surveillance of them and,
in the context of criminal law enforcement, at least, criminalizes unauthorized
interception. 9 0
To justify warrantless surveillance by CSEC, we thus need evidence that either a warrant requirement would unduly hamper its ability to collect national
security intelligence, or that the legislation provides an adequate substitute. This
evidence is lacking. As we have seen, CSIS must obtain warrants before conducting communications surveillance, and there is no indication that this requirement has thwarted that agency's national security efforts. As noted in Atwal,
judicial authorization was made part of the CSIS Act not only to protect citizens
against "unjustified surveillance,"'. 9 but also to bolster public confidence in the
agency's activities. The court stated that "[t]he credibility of the Service has a
direct and positive, but by no means exclusive, dependency on the credibility
of the judicial presence in the system."' This reasoning applies equally to
CSEC's domestic surveillance activities.
Nor does the NationalDefence Act provide anything to replicate the protections of ex ante judicial review. The legislation does subject CSEC's surveillance
activities to ex post oversight. The CSEC Commissioner, who must be a former

187. See Simmons, supra note 17; Monney, supra note 17; and Jacques, supranote 17.
188. See Simmons, ibid. at 527-29.
189. Ibid.at 528.
190.-Supra note 26.
191. Atwal, supra note 112 at 139.
192. Ibid. at 140.
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superior court judge,'1 3 is required, inter alia, to review "activities carried out"
under intercept authorizations "to ensure that they are authorized and report
annually to the Minister on the review."' As discussed, rigorous and independent oversight mechanisms are a helpful complement to judicial authorization,
especially in the national security context where investigative intrusions are so
rarely subject to ex post review. For several reasons, however, such mechanisms
are not a sufficient substitute for judicial authorization.
First, unlike ex ante authorization, ex post review obviously cannot prevent
unlawful invasions of privacy before they occur.' Second, effective review requires full information. On several occasions, the commissioner has reported
that CSEC failed to provide him with sufficient documentation to verify the
lawfulness of ministerial authorizations."' Third, the commissioner has no
enforcement powers. The public availability of annual reports undoubtedly
encourages compliance, but neither the minister nor CSEC is obliged to follow
the commissioner's recommendations or advice.' 7 Lastly, unlike a judge deciding
an authorization application, the commissioner is not empowered to issue authoritative interpretations of the governing legislation. In recent years, the
commissioner has disputed the government's interpretation of the ministerial
authorization provisions.'" However, in keeping with his advisory role, he has
193. NationalDefenceAct, supra note 160, s. 273.63. Since 2003, all commissioners have been
former justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. The current commissioner is Peter Cory,
who was appointed for a three-year term in December 2009.
194. Ibid., s. 273.65(8).
195. See Canada, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Annual Report. 20042005 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005) at 7 [Annual Report: 2004-20051.
196. Annual Report: 2007-2008, supra note 166 at 11-14; Annual Report 2005-2006, supra note
176 at 10.
197. See e.g. AnnualReport: 2007-2008, ibid. at 13 (noting that, in the case of one authorization,
"CSEC had not complied with expectations set out in the ministerial directive"); Canada,
Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Annual Report: 2008-2009 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2009) at 13 [Annual Report: 2008-2009]
(noting failures to meet expectations set out in authorizations and reporting an increase in
the number of inadvertent intercepts).
198. See Annual Report: 2007-2008, ibid. at 4; Canada, Communications Security Establishment
Commissioner, Annual Report: 2006-2007 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2007) at 2-3 [Annual Report: 2006-2007]; and Annual Report: 2005-2006, supra note
176 at 9-11.
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assessed compliance on the basis of the government's position.' For obvious
reasons, it is inappropriate to leave the interpretation of privacy-invasive surveillance powers to the government.
Whatever the merits of judicial authorization in principle, it has been suggested that courts lack jurisdiction to authorize foreign surveillance.200 A warrant
issued by a Canadian court authorizing a search in a foreign country would certainly not be recognized under that country's law. Parliament can, however,
empower judges to authorize Canadian officials to invade the privacy of Canadian
residents, even if the invasion is executed, in a.physical sense, outside Canada.201
As the Court has held, parliament "has the legislative competence to enact laws
having extraterritorial effect."202 Indeed, parliament has given jurisdiction to
courts to try numerous criminal offences committed in whole or in part outside
of Canada.20
Allowing courts to authorize foreign-executed intercepts of domestic communications, moreover, is consistent with the law's general approach to territorial
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is typically recognized when the subject matter has a
199. See Annual Report: 2008-2009, supra note 197 at 3, 10; Annual Report: 2007-2008, ibid at
10-11; and Annual Report: 2005-2006, ibid at 11.
200. See Annual Report: 2008-2009, ibid. at 8; Annual Report: 2005-2006, ibid. at 7-8; Annual
Report: 2006-2007, supra note 198 at 5; and Special Senate Committee on the Antiterrorism Act, FundamentalJustice in Extraordinary Times: Main Report of the Special Senate
Committee on the Anti-terrorismAct (February 2007) at 77.
201. See Friedland, supra note 81 at 276, n. 52. Transnational electronic communications are
transmitted by a variety of means (including wireless technologies like satellite and line-ofsight microwave radio-relay as well as wire-line technologies like copper and fibre optic cable), and may be intercepted at a variety of "places" (including terrestrial and space-based
wireless receivers, terrestrial and submarine cables, and telecommunications switching centres). CSEC likely conducts all of these types of intercepts, some of which occur within Canada in a physical sense (such as interceptions by satellite and microwave receivers on
Canadian soil or by wiretaps installed at the switching stations of Canadian telecommunications service providers). See Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment,"
supra note 149 at 105-08. Even if it is admitted, arguendo, that a Canadian court would not
have the jurisdiction to authorize an intercept placed outside of Canada, this does not explain or justify the absence of a judicial authorization requirement for CSEC intercepts that
areexecuted here.
202. Society of Composers, Authors andMusic Publishersof Canada v. CanadianAssn. ofInternet
Providers, [20041 2 S.C.R. 427 at para. 54 [SOCAN].
46
203. See e.g. CriminalCode, supra note 21, ss. 7, (3), 74, 75, 76-78.1, 83.08(1), 290(1)(b),
354(1)(b), 462.3, 465(4)-(5).
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"real and substantial" connection to Canada, and the granting of jurisdiction
would not unduly compromise the principle of comity between nations.20 '
As discussed, under the current legislative regime, CSEC is required to obtain
ministerial authorizations only for intercepts that may collect a "private communication," i.e., where one party to the communication is located in Canada.
This is surely a sufficient nexus to Canada. Indeed, in the context of telecommunications transmissions, the Court has held that Canadian courts have jurisdiction when Canada is either the country of origin2 11 or the country of
reception.20 ' And as for the question of comity, to the extent that a foreign
intercept intrudes upon the sovereignty or territorial integrity of other nations,
the intrusion is no greater if authorized by a judge than by a minister.207
Jurisdiction should not, therefore, be an impediment to instituting a scheme
of prior authorization for CSEC intercepts of the communications of Canadian
residents. Parliament should amend the NationalDefence Act to provide for a judicial authorization procedure for domestic intercepts. If it does not, the courts
20
should rule that the Act violates section 8 of the Charter.

IV. CONCLUSION
The threat of terrorism, in Canada and other nations, is undoubtedly very real
and must be taken with the utmost seriousness. Legal responses to this fear,
however, must be tempered by a rational analysis of risks and a commitment to
preserving as many of our liberties as are compatible with our need for genuine

204. Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 at 212-14.
205. Ibid.
206. See SOCAN, supra note 202 at para. 59 ("a telecommunication from a foreign state to Canada, or a telecommunication from Canada to a foreign state, 'is both here and there';
[r]eceipt may be no less 'significant' a connecting factor than the point of origin (not to mention the physical location of the host server, which may be in a third country").
207. The principle of comity may indeed suggest that such intercepts receive ministerial authorization, but as a prerequisite to, and not a substitute for, judicial authorization. See generally
CriminalCode, supra note 21, s. 185(1); CSISAct, supra note I11, s. 21(1).
208. See Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 31, § 17.3; Forsese, supra note 23 at 457-58;
Irwin Cotler, "Terrorism, Security and Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies" (2002-2003)
14 N.J.C.L. 13 at 45; and Friedland, supra note 81 at 276. For contrary views, see Cohen,
Privacy, Crime and Terror, supra note 23 at 228-31; Annual Report: 2004-2005, supra note
195 at 9.
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security. Many of Canada's legislative answers to the events of 9/11 have failed to
live up to this ideal. This is certainly true of the changes to communications
surveillance law effected by the Anti-terrorism Act. Both the exemption of terrorist offences from the investigative necessity requirement in part VI of the
Criminal Code and the creation of domestic surveillance powers under the
National Defence Act compromise privacy without achieving appreciable security gains. They should be struck down as violations of section 8 of the Charter.
The search and surveillance provisions in the CSIS Act, in contrast, set out
a reasonable accommodation between these competing interests. Is it a coincidence that the former provisions were rushed through parliament soon after a
brutal and traumatizing act of terror, whereas the latter were enacted in the aftermath of a comprehensive, independent, and scholarly review of the RCMP's
national security operations?209 To ask the question is to answer it.

209. See generally Andrew Goldsmith, "The Governance of Terror" (2008) 30 Law & Pol'y 141
at 156-59 (relating the hasty legislative process that resulted in the enactment of the AntiterrorismAct).

